

A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Trust in Recommendation Sarah H. Cen, Andrew Ilyas, Aleksander Mądry



Preferences are not fixed. Users change. Some



adapt to get what they want from platforms.

- Not clicking a link to avoid related ads
- Browsing content in incognito mode
- Trying not to "ruin" the algorithm

All of these break classical assumptions.

## Key issue: (Dis-)trust

Platforms don't

trust users.

Users don't trust platforms.

# Making things formal

Instead of fixed preferences, we model recommendation as alternating two-player game.

- Both **user** and **platform** outcomes improve when the platform cooperates & builds trust.







Actions: recommenders  $f \in \mathscr{F}$ Utility:  $U_p(f, b)$  (e.g., engagement)

#### Platform

Actions: behavior  $b \in \mathscr{B}$ Utility:  $U_u(f, b)$  (e.g., enjoyment)

User

#### **Strategy** *s* maps **history** *H* to **action**.

In response to platform strategy, users can be:

**Optimal:** 
$$s = \arg \max_{s_u} \sum_{\tau=1}^T U_u(s_p(H_\tau), s_u(H_\tau))$$

**Greedy (truthful):**  $s(H) = \arg \max_{b} U_u(s_p(H_\tau), b)$ 

A user **trusts** the platform is their optimal strategy is to be truthful!

Truthfully reports current interest  $\theta_t$ .

#### Strategic user:

Stops reporting when in less common mood.

- If platform assumes user is unimodal, will get
  feedback loops or learn average of moods.
- Even if platforms is bimodal, have to **guess** user's mood to serve correct content.
- Instead, platform should build trust by soliciting the user's mood.

### Takeaways

- Users of modern recommendation systems are **strategic** and have their own objectives.
- Can lead to **feedback loops** and **suboptimality.**
- We should develop systems with trust in mind!